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Colin Koopman*
Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism 
Abstract: Debates over the relative priority of experience and language have 
been among some of the most vexed, but also generative, disputes in pragmatist 
philosophy over the past few decades. These debates have, however, run into the 
ground such that both positions ind themselves at a deinitive standstill. I argue 
for a rejuvenation of pragmatism by way of moving beyond both the experience 
option (here represented by Dewey) and the linguistic turn in pragmatism (here 
represented by Brandom). We can move beyond these two categories, I argue, 
by resuscitating the categorical conception that has always been at the heart 
of pragmatism all along: action or, as I prefer to put it, conduct. In this paper,  
I develop an argument for “conduct pragmatism” on the basis of a return to William 
James’s earliest statements of pragmatism, statements that indeed occur prior to the 
oficial announcement of “pragmatism” in 1898. I draw on a dispute with Charles 
Sanders Peirce over the best interpretation of pragmatism as well as on a number 
of James’s early psychological writings from the 1880s leading up to the Principles 
of Psychology of 1890. These texts deinitively establish that the early James was 
what I call a “conduct pragmatist” well before his radical empiricism facilitated 
what was only a late turn toward the “experience pragmatism” that would come 
to impress Dewey and later scholars of classicopragmatism. The early James thus 
represents, I argue, a promising seed for a new third generation of pragmatism that 
may ind its way beyond the endings of both experientialism and lingualism, as well 
as their impasses with one another.
I. In Want of a Contemporary Pragmatism
There is in contemporary pragmatism a decisive want, in the older sense of that 
term more common to our inherited nineteenth-century than our contemporary twenty-
irst-century usages of English. What is wanted is a conception of pragmatism that 
fully acknowledges the widespread dissatisfactions with the two dominant categories 
that came to form a core dilemma for almost every major tradition in twentieth-
century philosophy: the categories of experience and language. What is wanted is the 
work of pressing pragmatism toward its next moment where it would be, perhaps, 
inally beyond the dilemmas these categories impose. This would require nothing less 
than a renewal of a pragmatism that readily accepts the deiciencies that have come 
to dominate our received categories and works to rectify their shortcomings. Richard 
J. Bernstein rightly argues that the “apparently well-entrenched dichotomy between 
experience and the linguistic turn is just the sort of dichotomy that pragmatists 
ought to reject”1. Rejecting this dichotomy from a pragmatist vantage, I shall argue, 
must involve allowing, and even cultivating, forms of pragmatism that are neither 
experience-centric (experientialist) nor language-centric (lingualist). It is in this sense 
that pragmatism today is in want of a new center.
* University of Oregon [cwkoopman@gmail.com] 
1. Bernstein (2010: 128).
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Why, we could ask, all the clinging to the over-freighted categories of experience 
and language? Why, we might wonder, does pragmatism refuse, time and again, to 
accept that these former options have grown exhausted? But I shall not here press 
for explanations of the entrenchment of the experientialist and lingualist perspectives. 
Rather, I shall press forward toward that which might fulill the want of pragmatism. 
Searching beyond experience and language, the history of pragmatism presents a third 
option which I propose to here begin the work of excavating. I refer to this third option 
as conduct pragmatism. At the center of this option is a species of pragmatism that 
revolves around a (re-)new(-ed) constellation of categories: conduct, action, practice, 
habit, and will. This constellation, I argue, helps pragmatism press further than do the 
currently-prominent centering notions of experience and language. To be sure, however, 
pragmatism in its irst two waves indeed offers formulations of experience and language 
that do invoke conceptions of conduct. Thus my claim could be read as simply a call to 
play up conduct-centering notions of experience and language. I suspect, though, that 
there will be considerable resistance to this from some contemporary pragmatists. For 
playing up conduct requires playing down formulations of experiential and linguistic 
pragmatism that fail to focus those notions in terms of conduct.
In developing conduct pragmatism, there is no need to deny experience and 
language their place. All that I propose is to shift the center of pragmatism’s vision. 
The categories of experience and language loomed large in early-twentieth and late-
twentieth century pragmatism respectively (as well as in philosophy more generally 
as suggested by the examples of other such traditions as analytic philosophy, 
phenomenology, and critical theory). Thus while there is no doubt that experience and 
language have some role to play in the continuation of pragmatism, I aim to encourage 
a toning down of the obsession that too often characterizes our idelity to (one or the 
other of) these categories. These categories are in need of a decisive decentering. For, 
as I have argued elsewhere, both Dewey and the later James massively overplayed 
their hands with their attachment to a metaphysics of experience, and Brandom and 
much of Rorty seriously overcommitted themselves to the restrictive strictures of 
the linguistic turn – what is most successful in the work of all four is an emphasis 
on the dynamic and processual aspects of practice, experience, and language, but 
this transitional quality of pragmatism too often gets lost in a idelity to experience 
or language2. Acknowledging these commonly diagnosed deicits in the history of 
a tradition of thought that nonetheless furnishes a massive embarrassment of riches 
might require a new focus, at least for awhile. If I am right that process and transition 
are among the key insights of pragmatism, then a renewed focus on a bloomingly 
processual notion like conduct seems a much better promise for pragmatism today 
than a continuation of the thankless labor of foisting processual interpretations on 
categories of experience and language that continually buckle under such hermeneutic 
insistence. I am urging that we trade in our anxieties over experience and language so 
that we may attend to that which may have always been the central term in pragma-
tism anyway: action, or conduct.
2. See Koopman (2009: 72-107).
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There are precedents for my approach in some of the most recent interventions 
in contemporary pragmatism’s experience-versus-language debates3. Consider as 
just one example how literary theorist Paul Grimstad has developed an insightful 
argument for the work of composition as the best path forward for contemporary 
pragmatism. Grimstad’s Experience and Experimental Writing: Literary Pragmatism 
from Emerson to the Jameses returns the reader to absorbing scenes of experimental 
literary production in mid-to-late nineteenth-century arts and letters in order to mount 
an argument concerning the options available to we contemporary pragmatists4. 
Grimstad’s argument is important because it is decisively situated at the centerpoint of 
our contemporary debate. Reviewing the crux of the issue between classicopragmatist 
experientialisms and recent neopragmatist lingualisms, Grimstad makes a bid for what 
we might call (not his term) a post-lingualist-experientialism. It is crucial that this 
position is beyond both second-generation lingualism and irst-wave experientialism. 
It is, to be sure, a return to the privileged scene of classicopragmatism, but only as 
absorbable through the insights of neopragmatism. This, I would argue, is quite close 
to fulilling the desiderata I am attributing to contemporary pragmatism. Grimstad’s 
gain is that he, unlike so many who would reiterate the same positions within either 
experience-centric or language-centric pragmatism, seeks to absorb the insights of both 
in order to develop some third. He does so, quite provocatively, by making use of the 
daring work of Stanley Cavell: “With the analytic [neo]pragmatists’ sensitivity to the 
myth of the given in mind, I want to return to Cavell’s description of composition as 
an experimental search, with the aim of inding in it an account of meaning that would 
be sensitive to the tension between the ‘given’ and linguistic meaning, yet not reduce 
meaning simply to a matter of justiication”5. Grimstad here calls for exactly what we 
require in the present moment: a restatement of pragmatism that is both hypersensitive 
to neopragmatist concerns and also rapt with classicopragmatist achievements6.
If those of us who are sensitive to both classicopragmatism and neopragmatism 
are not unbalanced by our double vision, as some would assert, then we are right 
3. In addition to Grimstad’s contributions in literary theory discussed here, see also important recent 
work in philosophy by contemporary European pragmatists Stephane Madelrieux (2012) and Sarin 
Marchetti (2012). I of course place no weight on a distinction between philosophy and literary theory, 
seeing them rather as mostly continuous.
4. Grimstad 2010.
5. Grimstad (2013: 10).
6. Grimstad, unfortunately, claims to meet these desiderata by way of a retrieval of composition that is 
itself cast in terms of a classicopragmatist conception of experience as process (2013: 1, 13, 120). This 
is by now a standard move – it is also pursued, for instance, by Bernstein (2010: 128) and in a way in 
some of my own earlier work in Koopman (2007). In contrast to this work, my argument is that a return 
to experience is hardly the most fecund path forward for pragmatism today. Fortunately, neither is such 
a return the primary lesson that Grimstad’s work teaches. For the important thing about composition 
is not that it experiential (as Grimstad wants to claim) nor that it is linguistic (as some others could 
conceivably claim), but rather that it is active. Composition is a species of conduct. Composition is an 
act. When a writer, a musician, a painter, or a dancer composes, they are doing something. This act of 
composition, interestingly, produces as the yield of its process a product that goes by the same name 
as the process. What I am suggesting, then, is that we follow the contours of Grimstad’s analysis rather 
than his self-interpretation of where that analysis should lead us. If we do so, we ind in Grimstad’s 
conception of composition a gesture that very much anticipates what we, today, are deinitively in 
want of.
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to want from contemporary pragmatism some new focal point toward which we 
could ind ourselves not looking askance. Satisfying this want requires the activity of 
pressing pragmatism forward. Pressing pragmatism toward its next generation (in the 
sense of that which pragmatism will itself generate) will involve a double task of both 
excavating that which is a resource within the tradition and renewing such resources 
as they are extracted midst contemporary problematics. In developing a version of 
third wave pragmatism focusing speciically on conduct, I shall here focus on just the 
irst of these two tasks (though I shall along the way offer a few suggestions about the 
latter, pointing there to what I regard as companion work that is already underway). 
I shall undertake this irst task by way of excavating from the early (by which I mean 
pre-1897) writings of William James a version of conduct pragmatism that has gone 
largely unnoticed in standard histories of pragmatism, clouded over as they have been 
by an obsession with the later (post-1896) Jamesian program of a radically empiricist 
metaphysics of experience. In excavating conduct pragmatism in the early writings of 
James I shall also have occasion to suggest what advantages it might offer to us today. 
Before turning to James, however, I shall begin by further motivating what I have so 
far merely claimed above regarding the discontent that is widely felt with respect to 
the still-resident options of experience pragmatism and language pragmatism (§§ II-
IV). After developing those doubts I shall go on to offer a suggestion as to how a 
contemporary renewal of an early Jamesian version of nineteenth-century pragmatism, 
prior to twentieth-century experiential and linguistic turns, may hold out promise as a 
renewing starting point for us today (§ V).
II. Criticisms of First- and Second-Wave Pragmatisms
One central task of pragmatism of any variety is to articulate an account of 
normativity without foundations7. There are, to be sure, other tasks on the pragmatist 
agenda, but no pragmatism can afford to shirk this central charge. My justiication for 
this strong claim is the history of the pragmatist tradition itself. Every critical moment 
in the history of pragmatism has been structured by at least this demand (and probably 
others too).
Consider the common wisdom that pragmatism enacts a philosophical 
accommodation of a culture of both epistemic and political uncertainty8. This familiar 
observation about the loss of certainty as a negative condition for pragmatism can 
also be put positively in terms of a less customary account of pragmatism as an 
accommodation to the taming of chance and the emergence of probability9. One 
advantage of the alternative narrative focusing on the positive conditions of chance 
is that it brings into clearer view the dual task of pragmatism as I have stated it: anti-
7. See my argument in Koopman 2011.
8. Kloppenberg 1986.
9. Hacking (1990) offers a masterful narrative of the taming of chance in the nineteenth century, a 
narrative that ends with Peirce as a culminating igure; I take up Hacking’s narrative in Koopman 
(unpublished-a) by focusing not on Peirce and the epistemic culture of chance but on James and the 
moral culture of chance.
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foundationalism plus anti-relativism. For one easy way to accommodate uncertainty is 
to mount an anti-foundationalist, anti-representationalist, and anti-absolutist offensive 
involving a lapse into relativism. But that is not pragmatism’s pursuit. Accommodating 
a culture of uncertainty in the senses highlighted by ideas of chance, probability, and 
possibility involves not only an anti-foundationalist offensive but also the dificult 
task of working out an alternative account of normativity (in its dual senses of both 
epistemic correctness and moral rightness) that is no longer reliant on foundations.
It is rather easy to abandon foundations if one is willing to endorse relativism, 
just as it is easy to account for normativity if one is willing to suffer foundations. But 
those easy paths have proven themselves dead-ends: abdications of the severe work 
of philosophy rather than expressions of it. Pragmatisms of every variety thus pose 
for themselves a formidable but crucial philosophical challenge: normativity without 
foundations, or authority without authoritarianism.
Unfortunately, various iterations of pragmatism that are exemplary of the irst 
two waves of the tradition have faltered in this task. The irst wave of experientialist 
pragmatism failed to fully outlank foundationalism because it worked too hard to 
center pragmatism on a conception of experience that sought to be anti-foundationalist 
but could not achieve its own stated aim. The second wave of linguistic pragmatism 
has been nothing but hyper-anxious about foundationalism, and so has not failed on 
that score, but rather with respect to the other desiderata of offering a compelling 
account of normativity. Such an account has, to be sure, been an express aim of many 
offerings exemplary of second-wave neopragmatism, but these offerings have, I argue, 
so far failed to catch their target.
III. The Criticism of Experientialist Pragmatism
My argument is that the experience pragmatism featured in James’s radical 
empiricism and Dewey’s experiential instrumentalism, despite its enormous merits in 
other domains, is limited with respect to my central problem of pragmatist philosophy: 
accounting for normativity without recurring to foundations. The two signature 
moments in early-twentieth-century pragmatism to which we can pin the criticisms 
I develop below can be found in Dewey’s metaphysics of experience and James’s 
radical empiricist program. For reasons of space, I shall focus the present discussion 
solely on Dewey, returning later to James, albeit to a much earlier James. I leave to the 
side James’s radical empiricism because I take it that James’s work there fairly clearly 
falls afoul of the antifoundationalist strictures I detail below in the more complicated 
case of Dewey’s instrumentalist empiricism10.
It is well known that neopragmatists have taken Dewey to task for his over-reliance 
on an unreconstructed (perhaps because unreconstructable) concept of experience. 
Rorty’s criticisms are the best known11, but consider how Brandom puts the point: 
10. See the latter chapters of James’s A Pluralistic Universe (1910a) for where radical empiricism falls 
foul.
11. Rorty (1992: 295; 1977: 81).
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“Dewey expended a great deal of effort in the dual process of trying to make clear 
and get clear himself about how the norms and standards and what they are norms 
and standards for assessing jointly develop in the course of experience. I cannot say 
that it seems to me that he succeeded very well at either task”12. Brandom develops 
this (Rortyan) argument by way of a (Sellarsian) criticism of Dewey’s experientialism 
according to which the latter commits what the former titled as the myth of the given (or 
what I like to call givenism)13. I do not think Brandom’s development of his criticism 
holds at a textual level insofar as his claim is that Dewey posits the “satisfaction of a 
desire” as epistemically determinative14. This is decidedly not Dewey’s view15.
Brandom nonetheless does make an important point that readers of Dewey ought 
not to treat too lightly. Consider Brandom’s concern that Dewey frequently invokes 
a concept that he forces to play the double-role that Sellars criticized as givenness: 
“On the one hand, one is not supposed to need to have mastered concepts in order to 
be in this state [...] On the other hand, being in those states is supposed to count as 
knowing something, in the sense that it provides evidence for or against the truth of 
a belief”16. That just is givenism, which is for Brandom (following Rorty, following 
Sellars) rightly a sin insofar as it cannot but help extending an invitation to empiricist 
foundationalism. Brandom misattributes this double-role to Dewey in pinning it on 
his concept of felt desire satisfaction, but we can rightly attribute this double-role to 
Dewey’s concept of felt qualitative immediacy, which is anyway far more central to 
his experientialist instrumentalism than desire ever was.
To see how the Sellarsian criticism sinks teeth into Dewey textually, consider 
Dewey’s account of pervasive unifying quality, a signature notion found throughout 
much of his later work. In his 1938 masterwork Logic: The Theory of Inquiry Dewey 
conceptualized “immediately pervasive quality” as that in virtue of which a situation 
is taken in immediate experience as a situation and also as that which offers regulatory 
and controlling guidance within the situation17. In an important statement leading up 
to his Logic, Dewey’s 1930 essay “On Qualitative Thought” poses what is perhaps 
his most pointed expression of the idea of qualitative control: “The underlying unity 
of qualitativeness regulates pertinence or relevancy and force of every distinction and 
relation; it guides selection and rejection and the manner of utilization of all explicit 
terms”18. Dewey’s claim, in short, is that there is a “unity of qualitativeness” in every 
situation that “regulates” and “guides selection”. Dewey repeated similar formulations 
12. Brandom (2011: 20); for a statement indicating that exactly this was one thing he sought to get clear 
on see Dewey (1938: 13).
13. Brandom (2000b: 73); see also the argument as sketched in Brandom (2004: 51).
14. Brandom (2004: 51).
15. Interestingly, this is also the criticism that Russell (1940: 404 ff. as cited in Dewey (1941: 181)) 
offered against Dewey at one point, to which Dewey (1941) satisfactorily responded that the criticism 
is based on a misinterpretation. For responses to Brandom in textual defense of Dewey see Bernstein 
(2007: 103-4), Hickman 2007, Putnam 2009, and Beisecker unpublished. Levine (2012: 130, 136) 
helpfully points out that Brandom may have subsequently retreated from this more pointed criticism 
(in 2000b) to a broader criticism (in 2011) of the type that I pursue here.
16. Brandom (2000b: 73).
17. Dewey 1938 : 73; see the entirety of Chapter 4 for a rich discussion of this notion.
18. Dewey 1930 : 247-8.
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again in the 1938 Logic19, and then again in a 1941 reply essay to critics where he 
wrote, “Inquiry begins in an indeterminate situation, and not only begins in it but 
is controlled by its speciic qualitative nature”20. The gist of the idea can be traced 
back as far as Dewey’s 1903 contributions to the Studies in Logical Theory, where 
he boldly proclaimed at the outset that, “it is the object of this chapter to present the 
problem and industry of relective thought from the standpoint of naïve experience”21. 
Though it stretches back to 1903 and culminates in 1938, Dewey irst consolidated 
these ideas in his 1925 Experience and Nature, where we ind him writing of “the 
primacy and ultimacy of gross experience” and where he asserts of such experience 
that “all cognitive experience must start from and must terminate in being and having 
things in just such unique, irreparable and compelling ways”22.
Now, if the “qualitative nature” or “primary experience” that Dewey explicitly 
posited as “controlling” is indeed “naïve” or “gross” in the sense of an experience 
that is taken as felt and nonconceptual, then we have here a paradigmatic statement 
of givenism. And, in fact, it is precisely in terms of nonconceptual experience that 
Dewey consistently speciied his idea of qualitative thought. In the 1930 essay he 
writes: “We are aware of it [i.e., quality] not by itself but as the background, the 
thread, and the directive clue in what we do expressly think of [...] It is felt rather than 
thought”23. That sounds to me about a striking a statement of the thought that quality 
is felt but not conceptual as one can imagine. This is a formulation that Dewey would 
repeat time and again in later writings, including Experience and Nature and Logic24.
From this we can conclude Dewey’s explicit thematization of the regulatory and 
directive nature of the perceptual-but-nonconceptual arena of the qualitative just is an 
incipient form of empiricist givenism. Dewey’s givenism is well summarized in his 
locution “qualitative control” which combines at once the two signature elements of 
the given: experiential feltness and normative regulation25. For these reasons, taking 
seriously Brandom’s (and Rorty’s) Sellarsian criticisms of classical pragmatism 
induces a shift of prioritization that breaks from an emphasis on qualitative experience 
in order to focus energy on other more fruitful aspects of the classical pragmatist 
program26.
19. Dewey there writes: “If the unique quality of the situation is had immediately, then there is 
something that regulates the selection and weighing of observed facts and their conceptual ordering” 
(1938 LW 12: 76), and “The universe of experience surrounds and regulates the universe of discourse 
but never appears as such within the latter” (1938: 74).
20. Dewey 1941: 181.
21. Dewey (1903: 53).
22. Dewey 1925: 24, 378; the latter quote is from the 1925 irst published version of the book’s opening 
chapter, which was later revised by Dewey in the 1929 edition.
23. Dewey 1930: 248.
24. In the Logic the idea is stated thus: “the situation as a qualitative whole is sensed or felt [...] It is 
not, as such, an object in discourse” (1938: 73-74). In Experience and Nature Dewey even goes so far 
as to describe “irreducible [and] indescribable qualities” as “self-suficient, wholly immediate, neither 
a relation nor an element in a relational whole” therein employing a formulation marking Dewey’s 
then-massive distance from the Hegelian critiques of immediacy with which he began his philosophic 
career (1925: 74).
25. Dewey 1938: 218.
26. At this point, it may be replied that Dewey’s view is that felt quality is a kind of mediated 
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It is crucial to underscore that the concerns I raise here warrant only a shift of 
prioritization – there is here no question of a full refutation of classical pragmatism. 
For it is undeniable that Dewey himself wrestled mightily with the problem I am 
articulating – and he is therefore a resource for us in similar pursuits today. Of “the 
given in the sense of the singular” Dewey claimed in the Logic that “it is taken 
rather than given”27. And whereas Experience and Nature located the “test” of ideas 
in “crude” primary experience, Dewey is more cautious in Quest for Certainty four 
years later where he explicitly states that “operations deine and test the validity of 
the meanings by which we state natural happenings”28. One can ind many other 
such formulations with the clear effect of an impression that Dewey sought at least 
sometimes to resist givenism. We should applaud this aspect of Dewey. But we 
need not commit ourselves to the devotional view that such occasional formulations 
from Dewey reach anything near the pitch of clarity that would only emerge with 
later pragmatisms developed by Sellars and Quine29. The problems with givenism 
are but dimly sensed in Dewey’s early experientialist pragmatism. That Dewey fell 
into the snares of givenism diagnosed by later thinkers is not particularly surprising 
upon relection if we consider that he articulated his experientialist programs well 
before Sellars, Quine, and others sniffed out some of the subtler dificulties haunting 
philosophical empiricism.
What is surprising, however, is the broad chorus of contemporary pragmatists who 
continue to draw on Dewey and James without reconstructing classicopragmatisms in 
light of neopragmatist criticisms. My point, of course, is not that this contemporary 
work is wrong. Rather, my concern is that the best of contemporary classicopragmatism 
immediacy, perhaps both perceptual and conceptual, as argued by Shane Ralston (2013: 7). On this 
reading Dewey(ans) could avoid givenism and at the same time present a picture of experience as 
bearing on normative determination. But this evasion is open to the pragmatist only if they can offer 
an explanation of how concepts igure directly into experiences that are “immediate” in contrast to 
“mediate” and as “had” in contrast to “known”. In other words, on the only interpretation that seems 
able to save Dewey from givenism, there is the dificulty of explicating how something can be both 
conceptual and not known, or what it means for experience (either taken holistically or in bits) to be 
“immediately conceptual” or “had as conceptual”. While I ind this an intriguing philosophical path, 
I do not see how Dewey’s own writings bear up all that well under this reading. In a slightly different 
vein, and since Ralston’s defense draws on (2013: 5-6) work by Mark Johnson (2007: 100), it is worth 
noting that in even more recent writings (2014: 100-102) Johnson offers an interesting defense of 
Dewey’s idea of qualitative guidance against the kinds of concerns I raise here. Johnson responds to 
earlier versions of this worry as raised by Shusterman 2000 and in Koopman 2009. Johnson regards 
Dewey as showing that qualitative experience guides us from a problematic to a resolved situation. 
I agree with this insofar as it is compatible with the thought that experience itself does not always give 
the clue for automatically resolving the problematic, especially where we ind ourselves in the face 
of conlicting moral values. Agreeing with this, however, I suspect there would still be disagreement 
between myself and most experientialist pragmatists with respect to just how far qualitative guidance 
concerning the problematicity or resolvedness of a situation takes us. I think it cannot take us very, such 
that almost all the dificult work is of the sort that will have to be hashed out on the level of ongoing 
conduct.
27. Dewey 1938: 127.
28. Dewey 1929: 90n2 (though note that the more cautious formulation is buried away in an exegetical 
footnote).
29. Calling these igures pragmatists is of course contentious – for one recent precedent in favor see 
Misak 2013 and for a recent statement of the counter view see Burke 2013.
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does itself a disservice by overextending its investments in experience. When this 
happens, what are otherwise brilliant insights of classicopragmatism get lost. To take 
just one example, I agree with David Hildebrand and Gregory Pappas that one signature 
advantage of classicopragmatism is its “insistence on the practical starting point”30. 
But I am puzzled about their claim that we must always specify the practical starting 
point in terms of a conception of “experience” that is assumed to always be “the best 
methodological starting point for a melioristic philosophy in a processual world”31. 
I take it to be a controversial issue whether or not a methodological prioritization of the 
category of experience is the best way of making sense of the pragmatist commitment 
to a practical starting point. My claim, developed below, is that conduct is more often 
a better starting point, and that experience ought to be pressed into service only to 
the extent that it actually illuminates practice. It might be thought that this is exactly 
what the experientialists are aiming for too, at least insofar as they can be read as 
suggesting that we ought to begin with experience in its active (but not passive) sense. 
Even on this view, however, there would still be an important site of disagreement: 
my claim is that experience matters only insofar as it illuminates practice such that 
practice could also gain illumination otherwise, whereas the experientialist view as it 
is often stated commits us to the claim that active experience is always the best way of 
illuminating action. But how could we possibly know that in advance? My argument 
begins with the claim that conduct or action is more intimate than experience with 
the “practice” that is rightly called for in pragmatism’s “practical starting point”. In 
that case, what matters in “active experience” is the “active” bit and not so much the 
“experience” part. For experience is methodologically dispensable should it turn out 
that we can gain focus on activity in some other way. And would the experientialists 
be willing to regard the experience part as dispensable? (I doubt it, but if so, then I 
welcome precisely that shift of attitude concerning experience.) For it is my view 
that experience (like everything else) must be dispensable if it should turn out that it 
does not feature in practice. This is why I would urge that experientialist pragmatisms 
could beneit from a fuller consideration of the advantages of the conduct option. 
Unfortunately, they have yet to do so, and in some cases they have even explicitly 
denied conduct its place in pragmatism, thus leading to the uncomfortable result of 
statements of pragmatism that expressly deny the import of action32.
30. Hildebrand and Pappas 2010. See further the elaboration of this idea in Hildebrand (2003: 6 ff., 
70 ff., and 181 ff.) and Pappas (2008: 11 ff., 20 ff.).
31. Hildebrand and Pappas 2010. For this “experientialist” interpretation of the important pragmatist 
idea of a practical starting point (PSP) see further work by both. Hildebrand often treats the PSP as merely 
methodological (2003: 71) but also frequently interprets it as a necessarily experientialist method: “the 
PSP may designate or denote experience without irst imputing a relective characterization to it [and] 
this is the sense in which experience is method” (2003: 189). In more recent work, Hildebrand brings 
to a nub the problem I am here articulating, and this may be evidence of a nuancing of his earlier view 
(2011: 55, 58). Pappas, by contrast, seems to state the view even more strongly in his claim for, “a pre-
relective, qualitatively felt present situation as not only the starting point but the ultimate source of 
guidance in moral life...the normative basis of our inquiries” (2008: 13) – here we have, in tight little 
capsule form, the dual-role of givenist feltness-plus-guidance. One source of this reading of the PSP 
common between Hildebrand and Pappas is Browning 1998.
32. See Pappas (2011: 175, 179).
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In favoring conduct over experience, of course, the third-wave pragmatist need 
not deny that experience plays some role in practice. The conduct option is not 
anti-experience so much as it is anti-experientialism. The problems of givenism are 
problems that plague the history of the empiricist insistence on a global experientialism 
according to which all knowledge claims are dependent upon experience (suitably 
construed, of course)33. In attending to those problems, we can of course accept that 
experience may igure locally within a practical context (even in normative practical 
contexts involving justiication). What is important to be clear about is that such 
featurings of experience in practice will always be a function of local conduct (e.g., in 
this practice of color reporting we take irst-person-singular experience as evidential) 
rather than an as-it-were global condition that holds for all possible practice (e.g., irst-
person-singular experience is by right always evidentially privileged). Indeed, one 
primary gain of the conduct perspective is that it enables us to dispense with the duty 
of having to decide between varying forms of activity (such as experience or language) 
as the global criterion of practice. That which igures locally in an assemblage of 
practice can be accepted as iguring in just the way that it actually does igure in the 
conduct of that practice.
To sum up, what is needful for any contemporary classicopragmatism today is an 
explanation of how experientialism can avoid the helpless backslide into givenism 
and then from there into foundationalism. It will not do to assert that James and 
Dewey sought to stake out an antifoundationalist pragmatism. Of course they did – 
and they deserve enormous praise for helping to initiate a trend that later pragmatists 
(Sellars, Quine, Rorty, and Brandom) could further only by standing on the ground 
gained by earlier classical pragmatism. But what is at issue is the extent to which 
James and Dewey (and their contemporary defenders) were successful at avoiding 
the snares of that more subtle form of foundationalism diagnosed as givenism, and 
indeed the extent to which they even could have been successful at that in light of their 
endorsement of a strong experientialist program. Such an explanation is incumbent 
upon contemporary classicopragmatists not only because we are today all aware of 
the truly colossal failings of the classical empiricist conception of experience, but also 
because Dewey himself inally succumbed to a frustrating awareness of the strain that 
any experience-centric philosophy must meet with34. My argument is that conduct 
pragmatism is, and on Deweyan grounds, a better option for us today than experience 
pragmatism. If Dewey inally admitted that he would change gears, then we should be 
willing to do so too. The problem is that too many contemporary classicopragmatists 
insist that the strain is not there and in so doing do not allow a reconstruction of 
33. As I understand it, a global experientialism would involve the denial of what Huw Price has called 
“local expressivism” (2011: 12). Price himself endorses a “global expressivism” (2011: 11), but I see 
no need to go that far and in that way.
34. See Dewey’s attempts at a revised preface to Experience and Nature in 1951 where he considers 
retitling the book Culture and Nature (LW 1: 361-2). See also Dewey’s late Unmodern Philosophy 
and Modern Philosophy (2012) where, in early chapters, he seems prepared to abandon the 
experientialist analytic of his earlier work in favor of a culturalist analytic that would be more clearly 
antifoundationalist. On the importance of the culture concept for the mature Dewey see Goldman 
2012.
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pragmatism itself. That will not do. Dewey’s misgivings cannot be wished away. 
What is needed is more work. We require a new composition of pragmatism.
IV: The Criticism of Lingualist Pragmatism
Another path in the history of pragmatism, and a second major branch open to 
contemporary pragmatism, takes its start from one version of another of the critiques 
of experientialism just discussed and from there takes a linguistic turn in order to re-
center the pragmatist vision wholly around language, discourse, and conceptuality. The 
deservedly best-known representative of this strain of pragmatism is Richard Rorty, 
whose Sellarsian diagnoses of modern philosophy in Chapter IV of Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature are not only masterful arguments, but are also obligatory reading 
that need be mastered by anyone who claims to be forwarding pragmatism today35. 
Following on his efforts in Mirror, Rorty went on to develop in Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity and other writings a thoroughly linguistiied pragmatism that brought 
the normative status of language use into focus by way of an idea of sociolinguistic 
consensus36. For Rorty, normative correctness or rightness is always only a function 
of what it is right to say within a given linguistic community, a view that he famously 
(and provocatively) dubbed “ethnocentrism”37. Critics worried that local rightness 
can be no better than relativism, even if Rorty’s initial point involved distinguishing 
relativistic nihilism from ethnocentric commitment38. Partly in response to worries that 
linguistic pragmatism could only fail to hold this crucial line, there soon opened up a 
pregnant space within neopragmatism for a thoroughly antifoundationalist version of 
pragmatism that would take the linguistic turn in a more systemic direction than was 
Rorty’s wont. Herein the importance of Robert Brandom’s linguistic pragmatism39.
Brandom’s masterwork, the 1994 book Making it Explicit, can be read as an 
attempt to deliver on the promise of his Doktorvater’s articulation of a thoroughly 
linguistic pragmatism that would rise to the challenge of accounting for practical 
normativity40. Brandom seeks to meet this challenge by way of a view according to 
which the normativity of semantic meaning is grounded in the pragmatics of what we 
are doing when we are speaking (or writing, or otherwise conceptualizing). At irst 
blush, then, it may appear that Brandom is working to approximate, via the centering 
of pragmatics (his version of pragmatism), what I am calling conduct pragmatism. 
But this is not so, for Brandom is interested in what we do only insofar as speaking 
is often a form of acting – the only form of action that matters for Brandom is speech 
action. Hence Brandom’s is a thoroughgoing linguistic pragmatism (or lingualism, or 
even a linguistic idealism) rather than a conduct pragmatism.
35. Rorty (1979: Chapter IV).
36. Rorty 1989.
37. Rorty (1985: 30).
38. For two rather interesting expressions of this exceedingly common criticism see Geertz 1986, and 
Janack 1998.
39. One might also think of Hilary Putnam and Jürgen Habermas as having explored this space, though 
less under Rorty’s shadow than Brandom has been.
40. Brandom 1994.
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One of the most common criticisms of Brandom’s pragmatism is that his lingualism 
(i.e., his focus on discursiveness, which is more or less his equivalent of Rorty’s 
idea of vocabularies) is reductive41. A related critique of Brandom’s philosophy of 
language (but this one would not apply to Rorty) is that it furthers this reductive trend 
in granting primacy to assertoric over other forms of discursiveness42. But my sense 
is that these critiques rather miss the point. I do of course agree with the criticisms 
when they are pressed at a general level (yes, of course, there is more to heaven and 
earth than what we can speak of, and certainly more than what we can assert), but 
I am not really sure what is supposed to follow from these general points with respect 
to Brandom’s case. For it seems to me that Brandom could always just reply that his 
aim is not to give an exhaustive ontology or a complete metaphysics. Rather, the aim 
might more modestly be to develop an account of only some range or subset of what 
a complete and exhaustive philosophy would countenance. The range or subset under 
focus has to do with normativity, thus illuminating a crucial connection between 
Brandom’s project and Rorty’s43. If the linguistic pragmatist can give an account 
of normativity without an appeal to foundations, then they seem to have discharged 
their self-assigned duty. The linguistic pragmatist can do this, moreover, without 
the insistence that “everything is normative” (and hence, conceptual and linguistic 
because normative). That sort of gloating globalist claim about all things under the 
sun is the only sort of claim that would actually open the linguistic pragmatist to 
the charge of reductivism. Interestingly, Brandom and Rorty have both clariied their 
position on the matter, in response to their critics, and explicitly claimed the more 
modest foci that obviate the frequent charges of reductivism44.
A more telling criticism of pragmatist lingualism than familiar chants about 
reductivism would be that it fails by its own lights to deliver a lingualistic explanation 
of normative phenomena. Indeed this is the only sort of criticism that would have any 
real internal bite against lingualist pragmatism. This criticism, moreover, gains real 
purchase when we try to understand exactly how the lingualist pragmatists position 
their accounts of normativity and justiication. To exemplify this, I will focus here only 
on Brandom, leaving Rorty now to the side. I do so because Brandom’s sociolinguistic 
account of normativity is more detailed, exhaustive, and systematic than Rorty’s. 
I take it that if Brandom’s account fails, then so too is it likely that Rorty’s does, at 
least in those respects relevant to my argument45.
It will be useful to irst outline Brandom’s account. Brandom’s semantics focuses, 
as already noted, on assertion. Brandom seeks to elucidate an assertoric semantics 
41. For one example see Levine 2012. For Brandom’s statements on the primacy of the linguistic see 
Brandom (1994: xi; 2000a: 5-7).
42. See for two examples Lance and Kukla 2010 and Taylor 2010. For Brandom’s statements on the 
primacy of assertion in language see Brandom (1994: 173; 2000a: 10-15).
43. On Rorty’s conception of justiication as essentially normative (in a sense proximate to Brandom’s) 
see Ramberg 2000 and Rorty’s endorsing reply 2000.
44. See Brandom’s response to Taylor 2010 where he happily concedes: “It might well be that issues of 
absolutely vital importance to human life can be addressed only by helping ourselves to considerations 
that go well beyond the rational side of our nature” (2010: 303). For Rorty’s similar view see his reply 
(2001) to Shusterman 2001.
45. I also argue against Rorty’s lingualism elsewhere in Koopman 2011.
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by grounding it in pragmatics. Brandom’s key question, then, is the following: What 
are we doing when we assert? Brandom’s answer is that we are committing ourselves 
to the content of that which is asserted. This commitment, on Brandom’s account, 
is best understood in terms of the generation of a deontic status that is not reducible 
to a deontic attitude. In speaking, it is Brandom’s argument, we institute deontic 
statuses, namely those of “commitments” and “entitlements” (corresponding with 
“the traditional deontic primitives of obligation and permission”)46. In other words, 
we bind ourselves to what we say as well as to others who might say (or question) 
what we say. It is by way of the idea of a deontic status, then, that Brandom aims to 
philosophically account for normativity, an understanding of which he regards as “the 
most urgent philosophical task”47.
Brandom’s account places an enormous weight upon the thin needle of an idea 
of deontic statuses. But when we ask what a deontic status is we run into dificulties. 
What are deontic statuses if not already normatively-loaded conceptualizations of our 
standing as assertors vis-à-vis other assertors? On Brandom’s view, every assertion is 
normative because it generates a deontic status to which the assertor is then bound, 
at least until such time as they publicly revise their commitments. But, one might 
worry, if what we are puzzled about in the irst place is normativity, then an appeal 
to deontic status is unlikely to help. Is this not a case of explaining the mysterious by 
the even more mysterious? We want to know what normativity in everyday assertoric 
use consists in and we are pointed toward an even more opaque form or standard 
of normativity in deontic status. To someone who starts out puzzled by normativity, 
these forays into the excesses of Kantianism are only going to make matters far worse. 
Likewise, someone who already has a working sense of the concept of a deontic status 
presumably will already understand a great deal about normativity. In short, Brandom’s 
account appears circular. And this is a more important failing than any supposed 
reductivism. For a circular account is one that fails to explain. Even if the circle is 
virtuous rather than vicious, the problem is that anyone who inds themselves outside 
of the circle needs to be irst brought inside of it if they are to gain any understanding 
at all. The philosopher cannot just point at the circle and think that doing so will 
magically whisk the initiate into the philosophic light. This failure of explanation 
is particularly problematic in Brandom’s case when we recall now that the original 
prompt for his systematic lingualism was the widespread perception that Rorty’s 
lingualist pragmatism lirted with relativism and so failed to evince an understanding 
of normativity. What Brandom’s pragmatism needed to do (by Brandom’s own lights) 
was to explain normativity. But all we are offered is a circular appeal to obligations 
and permissions. Presumably these were the very notions we needed an account of in 
the irst place.
The failure of this account, I think, owes in part to the linguistic tilt that Brandom 
gives to his account of conduct. Brandom asserts his commitment to what he calls the 
“fundamental pragmatism” shared by Dewey and Heidegger, namely the thesis that 
46. Brandom (1994: 159-160); for the fuller account outlined in this paragraph see (1994: Chapter 3).
47. Brandom (2009: 33).
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we should appeal to what persons do in order to explain what persons think48. In light 
of this, it might be thought that Brandom is indeed an exemplary conduct pragmatist 
for my purposes. In many ways he is, especially if we bear in mind my point that 
conduct is a thread that runs through all pragmatisms, and yet in a way that it does not 
receive suficient focus. But just as Dewey’s fundamental pragmatism goes astray in 
his being distracted by experiential quality, Brandom’s gets sidetracked by a focus on 
linguistic commitment. This is perhaps because Brandom only appeals to conduct to 
explain a range of semantic and discursive issues that are his true focus. Thus he is 
inclined to characterize conduct purely in terms of discursive commitment. This is not 
only restricted (which is not the same as saying that it is reductive) but also inadequate 
for making sense of even the normative status of linguistic action. What Brandom 
should be in a better position to see is that the fundamental pragmatist strategy he has 
employed for addressing certain problems of semantics actually blows up the space 
of that problematic. What Brandom should realize is that the fundamental pragmatist 
is not interested in conduct only because it helps us explain linguistic meaning, but 
rather that conduct is of interest with respect to a fuller array of problematics such that 
we should be wary of construing it in lingualist terms. 
V. Conduct Pragmatism: A Third Contemporary Option
Toward what shall pragmatism press? I have argued in previous work that the 
best heart of pragmatism is to be found in its focus on the transitional and transitive 
(the temporal and the historical)49. I want to suggest here that the third generation 
of pragmatism should replace the prior foci of experience and language with an 
undeniably transitionalist focal plane: namely, that of conduct, or action.
I noted above that a full development of conduct pragmatism requires at least two 
tasks. The irst would involve an interpretive excavation of the idea from canonical 
and marginal writings in the tradition. The second would involve a philosophical 
development of that which has been excavated. I shall here attend primarily to the 
irst, and then only to one aspect of the irst, by taking the early William James as 
my precedent. What I offer is a brief explication of one seed for conduct pragmatism 
that we can ind in the writings of the younger William James, prior to his enthusiasm 
for an experientialist articulation of pragmatism under the shadow of his radical 
empiricism and metaphysical pluralism.
There are, of course, other moments in the history of pragmatism to which we 
could turn for the beginnings of an elaboration of conduct pragmatism50. But I shall 
here focus on James, speciically the early James in the years before around 1896. 
48. Brandom (2011: 9).
49. See Koopman (2009: 50-71).
50. Peirce is one obvious resource: “Intelligence does not consist in feeling in a certain way, but in 
acting in a certain way” (Peirce 1893 CP 6.286); see discussion by Colapietro (1989: 109) and Bernstein 
(1965: 79). One could also draw on elements in the early Dewey (1895: 174), the later Dewey 1922, 
Mead 1938, Brandom (1994: Chapter 1) and Rorty (1989: Chapter 1) – the task in each case would be 
to read these texts in terms of conduct pragmatism thus bringing them out from under the shadow of 
experientialism and lingualism.
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In these earlier writings we get a full-enough statement of conduct pragmatism 
that I ind ripe for present development. What I thus propose is to begin third-wave 
pragmatism at that zero-moment of the tradition just before pragmatism received 
its oficial christening in James’s 1898 California address51. To press pragmatism 
forward today, I am arguing, we need to go back behind “pragmatism” itself. What 
we gain by losing the name, in fact, is its meaning: we retrieve a perspective that 
focuses on action, or πράγμα, or what I prefer to call, borrowing from the vernacular 
of nineteenth century American and English arts and letters, conduct.
One way into the conduct option is through another bit of vernacular, speciically 
that of the late-nineteenth century philosophical psychology in which James, 
Peirce, and others of their generation found themselves immersed. According to a 
then-standard approach, human psychology can broadly be classiied according to 
a three-part typology of thinking, feeling, and willing. While everyone employing 
this typology agreed that any psychology must allow all three of these types their 
place, one debate that was then important, especially for the early pragmatists avant 
la lettre, was which of the three ought to be accorded analytic and explicative priority. 
Which, as Peirce would have put it, is “Third”? Which, as James himself did put it, is 
“department Number Three”? The subsequent history of pragmatism can be read as 
a development of this question. In irst-wave pragmatism, the psychology of feeling 
came to the fore, as the emphasis is on experience, particularly the qualitative and non-
ratiocinative experience at the heart of Dewey’s postulate of immediate empiricism 
and James’s radical empiricist lux52. In second-wave pragmatism, the psychology 
of thinking comes to the fore and the emphasis is on conceptuality, often understood 
in terms of discursive capacities, as evidenced in both Rorty’s linguistic pragmatism 
and Brandom’s self-titled rationalist pragmatism53. If, as I have argued above, we 
meet with certain long-standing (though perhaps one day negotiable) impasses with 
irst-wave “feeling pragmatism” and second-wave “thinking pragmatism”, then it is 
time that we give third-wave “willing pragmatism” its inning. This means trying out 
pragmatism as conduct pragmatism.
Given the later James’s emphasis on experience, it is often assumed that his 
lifelong philosophical answer to the crucial question concerning “department Number 
Three” would have been feeling, or experience. James’s pragmatism, we are told 
time and time again, was a pragmatism of experience. In the face of this common 
wisdom, it is jarring then, to read Peirce’s criticisms of his longtime friend James in 
the former’s entry under “Pragmatism” in Mark Baldwin’s 1902 “century” Dictionary 
of Psychology and Philosophy:
51. James 1898.
52. I do not hold that feeling is in fact identical with experience, but rather that experiential pragmatism 
is primarily a pragmatism of “feeling” in the latter-nineteenth century sense of that term. This is born 
by a rereading of the emphasis on the “feltness” of experience that pervades the writings of both James 
(1910) and Dewey (see citations above).
53. Again, my point is not that thinking is in fact synonymous with conceptuality, but rather that 
a typology that is able to distinguish thinking, feeling, and willing will tend to align the irst term 
with rationality, conceptuality, and discursive whilst aligning the second term with experience and 
quality. On the rational nature of the conceptual see for instance Brandom (1994: Chapter 3) elsewhere 
explicitly framed as a version of “rationalist pragmatism” (2000a).
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In 1896 William James published his Will to Believe, and later his Philos. Conceptions 
and Pract. Results, which pushed this method to such extremes as must tend to give us 
pause. The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action – a stoical axiom 
which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly 
as it did at thirty. If it be admitted, on the contrary, that action wants an end, and that 
that end must be something of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself, 
which is that we must look to the upshot of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend 
them, would direct us towards something different from practical facts, namely, to 
general ideas, as the true interpreters of our thought.54
Peirce here attributes to James a view which he admits that he, Peirce, had endorsed 
as a younger man (of thirty), but which he has since (now being sixty) seen beyond, 
while James apparently remains beholden to it.
Consider now James on Peirce in that 1898 “Philosophical Conceptions and 
Practical Results” address in California that is generally view as the oficial 
inauguration of “pragmatism”. James there attributes to Peirce this view:
The same thought may be clad in different words; but if the different words suggest 
no different conduct, they are mere outer accretions, and have no part in the thought’s 
meaning.55
Continuing, James tells us that he himself will interpret pragmatism “more broadly” 
than Peirce:
The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or 
inspires. But it inspires that conduct because it irst foretells some particular turn to our 
experience which shall call just that conduct from us.56
All of this requires some explanation. Where are we?
In 1902 Peirce attributed conduct pragmatism to James (and his own younger 
self), and criticized that view, preferring to place conduct in the service of thinking 
(“general ideas”). But already by 1898 James had attributed conduct pragmatism to 
Peirce, himself putting conduct in the service of what is qualitatively felt (“some 
particular turn to our experience”). Peirce’s 1902 objections to James thus seem to 
be aimed at a position that James himself hardly seemed to hold. Peirce was, to be 
sure, in part distancing himself from the view James had imputed to him. But Peirce, 
both in print and in correspondence, continued to press the objection as an objection 
not against his younger self so much as against James57. Why? Did James ever even 
hold the view that conduct is, as Peirce had put it, both in public print and in private 
correspondence to James, “the be-all and the end-all”58? Did Peirce himself ever hold 
that view in any serious way? Who, if anyone, ever really held the view such that 
54. Peirce (1902: 322).
55. James (1898: 348).
56. James (1898: 348).
57. See Peirce 1907 EP 2: 401 (in Variant 1) and EP 2: 432 (in Variant 2); Peirce to James, Jan. 23, 
1905 in CWJ 10: 535.
58. Peirce (1905: 341); see also Peirce to James, Nov. 25, 1902 in CWJ 10: 157.
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Peirce felt the need to continually refute it and James so frequently sought to distance 
himself from it?
In his later writings, at least, James increasingly dedicated himself to a version of 
experience pragmatism. Experience, especially in the shape of radically empiricist 
experience, is all over the Essays in Radical Empiricism (published posthumously in 
1912, but developed most fully in two essays of 1904 and 1905), A Pluralistic Universe 
(published in 1910), and much (but certainly not all) of Pragmatism (published in 
1907) too. All of these texts were written under the shadow of a radical empiricism in 
the service of experience59. And already in his 1898 essay James puts conduct in the 
service of experience. Had Peirce missed his target altogether? Had James ever really 
endorsed a pragmatism centered on conduct rather than experience?
Yes, he had, and decidedly so. If we turn back to James’s works before his radical 
empiricist period, namely those of his writings up until around 1897 or so, we ind 
rich resources for developing pragmatism along the lines of a conduct pragmatism. 
In turning back to James’s writings where an emphasis on willing and conduct is 
marked, we can show not only that Peirce’s criticisms of James in 1902 were aiming 
at a real target (because James did oficially forward a version of conduct pragmatism 
in earlier writings), but also that the target itself may be more interesting than Peirce’s 
criticisms, and James’s later abandonment, seem to have suggested.
The view I shall be tracking is one that James expressed in a letter to his 
younger brother Robertson in 1876: “My ‘dying words’ to you are, ‘outward acts, 
not feelings’!”60. James, it would turn out, did not die with these words, trading in 
conduct for feeling almost twenty years later. These are, nevertheless, among some 
of James’s most fecund words for pragmatists today. Their further development in 
his early published writings gives the contemporary conduct pragmatist much from 
which to glean.
In his 1884 essay “The Dilemma of Determinism” James confronted that twain 
issuance of the late nineteenth century described by Hacking as the parallel tendencies 
of the taming of chance and the erosion of determinism61. The essay is devoted to 
one of the centermost preoccupations of all of James’s philosophizing: freedom. 
James’s tactic in the essay is not that of mounting a refutation of determinism and 
a defense of voluntarism. Rather he seeks to mount a moral defense of chance against 
determinism’s denial of its very possibility. But where is chance located? And where 
59. My claim is not that James’s later works were not all-experience and no-conduct. My point rather 
concerns their relative weight. Consider, for instance, James’s claim in the “Preface” to Pragmatism 
that “there is no logical connection between pragmatism [...] and a doctrine [...] set forth as ‘radical 
empiricism’” (1907: 6). This noted, consider also that in the “Preface” to The Meaning of Truth: 
A Sequel to “Pragmatism” James is already pushing for a tighter connection in saying that “the 
establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of irst-rate importance in making radical 
empiricism prevail” (1909: 172). These two prefatory remarks are not inconsistent, though they do 
tend to push in different directions. I am in fullest agreement with James when he says, in the earlier 
text, that “one may entirely reject [radical empiricism] and still be a pragmatist” (1907: 6). I see myself 
as here following up on that suggestion and so my mantra is: “let us be action-oriented pragmatists 
without having to be metaphysicians of experience”.
60. James CWJ 4: 586.
61. See Hacking 1990.
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would determinism deny its possibility? For James in 1884, the terrain of freedom 
is not to be located in argumentative reason, nor even in felt sensation (where he 
would come to locate it later), but rather in action. The possibility of freedom that 
James defends throughout his early writings is a possibility of enacting freedom, and 
it is in his early writings that he is most explicit that it is on the plane of action 
where determinism’s denials are at their most demoralizing. This helps explain 
why all of James’s early defenses of freedom are explicitly articulated on a moral 
register, and why on every occasion he explicitly disclaims a metaphysical defense of 
freedom according to which freedom can be proven62. Freedom was for James always 
primarily a moral and not a metaphysical category, and thus it is something that must, 
if it is to exist, be enacted, perhaps even composed. James thus wrote in his 1884 
essay, embracing Carlyle’s philosophy of work, that “conduct, and not sensibility, 
is the ultimate fact for our recognition”63. Such recognitions of conduct are, it turns 
out, pervasive in James’s early writings. They not only center his moral writings on 
freedom, but as well his early and monumental contributions to psychology, also 
articulated in an explicitly non-metaphysical register.
James’s published his monstrous magnum opus in 1890, claiming that it was “in 
irreproachable shape” by the time it was inally delivered to the publisher nearly one 
decade later than originally promised64. Jacques Barzun, almost one hundred years 
hence, would ind it instead “a masterpiece in the classic and total sense”65. The 
Principles of Psychology begins on the irst page by deining the scope of its subject 
matter: “Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and their 
conditions”66. Though James focused his work on the mental life, the entire book 
would be radically misconstrued if situated as another contribution to that long line 
of philosophies of consciousness. James’s concept of mind is of mentality emplaced, 
embodied, and above all enacted. For James, in fact, the mind is deined as a form of 
action. Mindedness is not a form of awareness (sentience) or cogitation (sapience), 
though it may involve that as part of its work. Mind for James is a form of action 
whereby the pursuit of ends is carried out with variation in means: “The pursuance 
of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and 
criterion of the presence of mentality”67. James offers the memorable example of a 
frog in an aquarium. We place an inverted jar full of water above our frog presently 
resting at the bottom of the tank. We wait and the amphibian soon in want of breath 
will begin its journey upward toward the surface. But if frog proceeds upward into 
the jar we have placed above it will ind itself impeded and then, in the crucial display 
of mindedness, “will restlessly explore the neighborhood” until it inds a path to the 
surface68. Contrast frog to your loatable rubber ducky released from the same bottom 
62. James (1884: 588; 1890 II: 569-579) are two instances; for a much earlier autobiographical note to 
this effect see James (1870: 7).
63. James (1884: 604).
64. James in CWJ 7: 35.
65. Barzun (1983: 34).
66. James (1890 I: 1).
67. James (1890 I: 8).
68. James (1890 I: 7).
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of the tank upward into the same inverted jar. Your ducky will forever press its nose 
up against the glass. Little ducky would go further could it do so, but unlike frog it 
cannot vary its means toward the achievement of its ixed ends. Our friend frog is 
minded but ducky has no mind at all. James continues, explicitly deining the quality 
of mind in these terms as a species of action: “no actions but such as are done for an 
end, and show a choice of means, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind”69. 
James, almost mocking Cartesian consciousness, remasters the classical concept of 
mind by locating it in action. For Descartes, mind was still and silent, sitting by the 
ire, unmoving and calm, meditative. Mind becomes reason, thoroughly aware of 
itself. For James, by contrast, mind is typiied by the active creature who is creative in 
pursuing its ends in its environments. Mind becomes movement conducting otherwise 
dead matter.
Having thus speciied the mind in chapter I, James turns in chapter II to the brain, 
which he introduces through a brief discussion of the concept of relex action. Here 
he claims that “relex and voluntary performances shade into each other gradually” 
thereby foreshadowing the later culminating claims of the book in the long chapter 
XXVI on the will. The discussion of relex action in the early chapter of the Principles 
is surprisingly brief. But James’s 1881 essay “Relex Action and Theism” offers an 
extended development of the idea. Interestingly, this is also the essay in which can 
be found James’s irst public, though not quite yet oficial, reference to pragmatism, 
namely Peirce’s pragmatism as laid out in the 1878 Popular Science Monthly essays 
of a few years previous70. James writes that “it may be said that if two apparently 
different deinitions of the reality before us should have identical consequences, 
those two deinitions would really be identical deinitions, made delusively to appear 
different merely by the different verbiage in which they are expressed”, footnoting 
Peirce’s article in which the pragmatic maxim was irst announced as explanans71. 
James’s essay itself is not speciically devoted to pragmatism, but taking note of the 
quotation and footnote is helpful, for it motivates my more general claim that James 
was long a pragmatist before oficially announcing himself to be such in his 1898 
California lecture.
If James was indeed already a pragmatist of any variety in 1881, he was a 
pragmatist of the conduct stripe. Referring to the relex arc concept with high praise 
as the “great achievement of our generation” James addresses himself in the essay to 
tracing its consequences, speciically for religion, and for religious belief. It is not 
so much the implications that concern us here as James’s stylization of the relex 
arc idea: “The current of life which runs in at our eyes or ears is meant to run out at 
our hands, feet, or lips [...]. The willing department of our nature, in short, dominates 
both the conceiving department and the feeling department; or, in plainer English, 
perception and thinking are only there for behavior’s sake”72. Here we have the three 
key terms of a quintessential triad for pragmatism and a general typology in late 
69. James (1890 I: 11).
70. See especially Peirce 1878.
71. James (1881: 124).
72. James (1881: 114).
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nineteenth century psychology73. What matters philosophically is that each term in 
the triad offers a different point of emphasis in how to interpret the upshot of Peirce’s 
pragmatic maxim.
Quality, Thought, Action. Feeling, Conceiving, Willing. Experience, Language, 
Conduct. How should the pragmatist prioritize among these? Peirce seems to have 
often held Thought as Third. James, later in life, seemed to hold Feeling as Third, as 
Dewey would too in developing his qualitative pragmatism. But here, in 1881, James 
is unequivocal: Conduct is Third. It is Action, Habit, and Will that form the assemblage 
assuming the privileged place of what he calls “department Number Three” that “ever 
lurks in ambush, ready to assert its rights”74. James’s view is unambiguously stated: 
“Transformation is effected in the interests of our volitional nature, and for no other 
purpose whatsoever”75. In another short essay of 1882, which James quoted from 
at length in Principles, he concurs: “It is far too little recognized how entirely the 
intellect is built up out of practical interests [...]. Cognition, in short, is incomplete 
until discharged in act”76. Later on, in an 1888 Scribner’s article also selectively re-
quoted in Principles, James states: “the thinking and feeling portions of our life seem 
little more than half-way houses towards behavior; and recent Psychology accordingly 
tends to treat consciousness more and more as if it existed only for the sake of the 
conduct which it seems to introduce, and tries to explain its peculiarities (so far as they 
can be explained at all) by their practical utility”77. None of this is to insinuate that for 
the early James there is no room for feeling or thinking. The claim is only about what 
takes priority: what is in the service of what: what is central and what is remainder 
in the pragmatist perspective. For all pragmatists, all three departments are crucial. 
But one department must lead and coordinate, even if only to provide a semblance of 
methodological priority. For James in his early work, conduct was crown.
Why, it might be wondered, force ourselves to choose?78 It might be objected that 
we can and should adopt a meta-pragmatist stance toward pragmatism itself. This 
might involve allowing ourselves to decide which of the three options (experience, 
language, and conduct) to prioritize on the basis of an analysis of the practice in 
question. The objection is important because it calls into question my emphasis on 
the need to prioritize amongst the three categories. But in defense of prioritization 
I hold that deferring the issue can only lead us back to the very same question all over 
again. We cannot defer analytic prioritization by way of waiting upon an analysis of 
whatever practice is in question. This is because what is at issue is precisely how one 
73. On the widespread (and quite varying) uses of this triad in late nineteenth century psychology see 
Bordogna (2008: 148 ff.).
74. James (1881: 127).
75. James (1881: 117).
76. James (1882b: 65-66) quoted in James (1890 II: 314), and in (1882a: 84); see also (1890 II: 372).
77. James (1888: 240).
78. For instance, Francesca Bordogna’s interpretation of James’s relation to the triad is representative in 
that she reads James as undermining the traditional separation between the three (2008: 151). I contend 
that James found methodological value in separation such that he sought to keep the distinction usable 
in order that we might focus on different points of the triad playing the leading role. It is my view that 
James (both later and younger) sought to make use of the distinction (differing with himself only over 
which of the three departments would lead, but not over whether some one department must so lead).
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is to pragmatically specify what counts as the practice in question. A reference to 
practice cannot settle the issue of prioritization because what is at issue are the very 
terms according to which we are going to refer to practice. At issue, in other words, 
is a central (perhaps the central) methodological question of pragmatism: What is the 
leading index for the “practical starting point” that is the focus of every pragmatism? 
Which of experience, language, or conduct gives us the best methodological grip on 
practice itself? This is an issue that cannot, for reasons of regress, be settled by an 
appeal to practice itself 79.
This position is not mine alone. James and Peirce both held that the prioritization 
question could not be shoved to the side. The younger James resolved the question in 
favor of conduct. And so Peirce’s arrows in 1902 were rightly aimed. The 1881 article 
at which they were aimed was by then twenty years past, it is true, but undoubtedly 
James had made his views known to Peirce time again in personal conversation, not 
to mention in correspondence, not to mention quoting and re-quoting said view in 
his series of psychology books, as well as in other writings. James and Peirce were 
two longtime friends unlikely to foist misunderstandings on one another. Their minds 
were on the most intimate of terms. James had held the view that Peirce criticized him 
for holding, even if he had largely abandoned it in large by the time the criticism was 
inally foisted.
Of course, James never fully abandoned the emphasis on conduct, as noted by 
Sergio Franzese’s recent treatise on Jamesian energy80. In turning to James in the 
service of developing a conception of conduct, the early James will be the irst place to 
turn81. But the second place to consider will be a number of later writings where James 
continues, if only on occasion, to emphasize action82. One obvious source would be 
James’s 1896 offering “The Will to Believe” whose central problem throughout is a 
problem of action and speciically of acting in the face of chance (but only chance)83. 
79. I thank both David Rondel and Alexis Dianda for pressing me on points in this paragraph.
80. I endorse at a broad level Franzese’s claim that, “The view of humans as ‘indeterminate’ beings 
hinges on James’s notion of primacy of action” (2008: 5), but I depart from his attempt to read this 
notion quite broadly in James’s later writings (105 ff.) on the basis of an excavation of the idea in 
earlier work (99 ff.). I wish Franzese were right, but I cannot but lament that James’s later writings so 
often cede the primacy of action for the sake of the prioritization of experience. My worry vis-à-vis 
Franzese, then, is that we must always be careful to distinguish the two analytically distinct notions of 
conduct and experience.
81. However, just as the later James was not all-experience and no-action, the earlier James was not 
all-action and no-experience, as even just a quick skim of the Principles (1890) will show. As noted 
previously, my argument only concerns the relative weights assumed by these notions in different 
periods of James’s career.
82. Even in the central writings of James’s radical empiricist project, there is a continuing role for 
action to play; see James (1904a: 181; 1904b: 201).
83. It may be thought that the publication date of “The Will to Believe” calls into question my emphasis 
on a divide in James’s thinking around the year 1896. This is the occasion to emphasize that I do not 
require for my argument either a sudden or a total break in James’s work. I only mean to point out a 
decided shift in emphasis. With that in mind, it bears noting that the problematic of “The Will to Believe” 
is one that James had long been working through, despite the seemingly hurried composition of the text 
in 1896, as noted by Gavin (2013: 4, 43, 55, 91) and discussed by Hollinger (1997) and others. As early 
as 1879 James published a review of two of Clifford’s works in The Nation (1879) focusing on exactly 
the position that he would later attribute to Clifford in 1896 and then seek to dismantle. On the other 
end, that James never lost sight of interest in these questions (and thus questioning any idea of a “total” 
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The point of “The Will to Believe” is that not only do we meet with real situations of 
indeterminacy where we ind ourselves confronting our own hesitation against action, 
but that further these indeterminacies need not be taken as burdens which we cannot 
bear. We could bear them, James is arguing, if only we are willing to act anyway. 
We can thereby, through conduct, even a stuttering conduct, possibly determine the 
indeterminate84. And we can do so in a way that would work through indeterminacy 
rather than annul it. This is to treat indeterminacy as a possibility and opportunity 
for the vita activa, rather than to cast it in terms of debilitating doubt that must be 
banished from the res cogitans. A crucial point on which James’s “Will to Believe” 
focuses, then, is a strident emphasis on the centrality of willing for our active living. 
As I argue elsewhere, James’s “Will to Believe” cannot be made sense of without 
situating it within the conceptual constellation adumbrated in the “Will” chapter of 
the Principles only six years early85. That conceptual constellation, as we have seen, 
igures the will in terms of conduct and action. 
From 1881 to 1890 to 1896, James’s philosophical focus yielded a true pragmata-
ism where human conduct was the center of analytic attention. Anthropologist Elizabeth 
Povinelli (in a recent article on Foucault and James on the will) offers a compelling 
summary statement of the conduct-centered quality of Jamesian psychology: “Minds 
qua minds, as well as particular minds and their mental contents, were the result of 
an embodied history of effort and exhaustion, striving and succeeding, striving and 
failing, and doing so in a socially differentiated world”86. Following these (and other, 
for there are many more passages from which to select, to be sure) early elaborations 
of a conduct-centered pragmatism, there then came a fairly major shift in James’s 
thinking in the years leading up to and following 1896. That there was such a shift has 
been well documented by previous scholars87. And yet the speciic terms of this shift, 
as one that took James out from his habitation in a conduct-centered methodology, 
have not been frequently observed. Too many have looked forward out of the shift 
toward experience pragmatism. I am encouraging that we look back behind it. For 
prior to his change of attitude, James can be seen, as his most able reader, Charles 
Santiago Peirce, noted in criticisms both public and private, a conduct pragmatist.
VI: The Conduct Option
Language and experience both matter to philosophy, but their matter carries less 
gravity than does action. Consider in conclusion two key methodological gains of 
pragmatism. One is an emphasis on transitionality, or temporality and historicity. 
break between the conduct pragmatism prominent in the early James and the experientialism prominent 
in the later James) is evidenced by his later revisions of the will to believe argument in his “Faith and 
the Right to Believe” fragment (1910b).
84. I borrow the notion of the stutter from Alexander Livingston’s (2013) excellent essay on the 
Jamesian will.
85. See Koopman (unpublished-b).
86. Povinelli (2012: 465).
87. See for instance discussions by McDermott 1977, Seigfried 1990, Lamberth 1999, and Bordogna 
2008. A common refrain (which I here repeat, though with an eye toward a different result) is that 1896 
was the year in which James irst announced radical empiricism (1896b: vii).
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The other is an emphasis on the relay between problematizations and reconstructions 
as the site where normativity, and much else too, would unfold. Packaging these two 
together, we can recognize that the great gain of pragmatism is that it proposes an 
account of normativity framed in terms of the transitional processes whereby we 
reconstruct problematic situations. Pragmatism thus proposes to both countenance 
normativity and do so without invoking foundations – thus fulilling what I described 
above as the twain desiderata of normativity without foundations or authority without 
authoritarianism.
How does conduct fair as a methodological category that leverages pragmatism’s 
twin insights of a transitional focus and a problematic method? There is no need to 
pretend that I could decisively answer this question here. But allow me to conclude 
with some suggestions.
First, conduct is, as already noted above, an inherently dynamic notion. Conduct 
is, in every instance, in motion. Conduct is pre-eminently a doing rather than a thing 
done. The conduct option is thus so attractive because it points directly (not merely 
indirectly as is the case with the other two offerings) to the centrality of historicity and 
temporality at the heart of pragmatism. Though prior pragmatisms may have worked 
toward accounts of language and experience as dynamic in character, it is undeniable 
that thinking and feeling admit of static treatment in a way that conduct simply does 
not. A doing is something that moves, while meaning has for us almost entirely lost 
its verbal sense, and experiencing is already an awkward construct in contrast to an 
experience. Conduct is unavoidably processual.
Second, it is my bid that the ineluctably transitional quality of action or conduct 
that best facilitates pragmatist attention to normative reconstruction or melioration. If 
the core of pragmatism in each of its successive waves is the idea of transitions from 
a problematic or indeterminate beginning to an unproblematic or determinate ending, 
then action or conduct offers a register on which we can specify reconstruction in just 
those terms. For what matters most when we come up against the press of a problem 
or compose a reconstructive response is the hesitation or action at issue. Although 
feeling and thinking may serve as proxies here, what they are proxies for, and what 
they are therefore in the service of, is conduct. We might then say that pragmatism is 
the philosophy that afirms the import of experience and language by locating them 
within the ield of conduct in which human lives are leadings to and fro88.
88. For comments on earlier drafts of this paper I thank David Rondel, Stéphane Madelrieux, two 
anonymous reviewers, David Hildebrand, and an audience at the New School for Social Research 
(including Ramón del Castillo, Alexis Dianda, Paul Grimstad, and Josh Kaye).
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